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Kentucky's New Broad Form Deed
Law-Is It Constitutional?
By ROBERT M. PFEIFFER*
INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that an owner of real property
may sever the mineral and surface estates, either by grant or
reservation.I Since the minerals themselves would be useless with-
out the right to mine them, certain mining rights arise by nec-
essary implication from the grant or reservation. 2 Other mining
rights, such as the right to strip or surface mine, are not implied
and attach to the mineral estate only if supported by the lan-
guage of the severance deed. The issue of whether the mineral
owner may surface mine property has historically been a contro-
versial one in Kentucky, especially in cases in which the mining
rights of the mineral owner spring from a particular type of
severance deed known as the "broad form deed."
In 1984, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted House Bill
32 (HB 32)3 in the latest of a series of efforts to restrict the.
right of the grantee under a broad form deed to surface mine
the property. Almost immediately, questions were raised as to
the constitutionality of the legislation. This issue is made partic-
ularly urgent by the recent decision of the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky enjoining the Natural Re-
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1977,
Stanford University; J.D. 1980, Ohio State University. Mr. Pfeiffer is a partner in the
Lexington, Kentucky law firm of Pfeiffer & Thomas and is engaged in the private
practice of energy law.
I E.g., Kincaid v. McGowen, 4 S.W. 802 (Ky. 1887). Although there may be
reasons for treating a grant of mineral rights differently than a reservation (see Croley
v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964)), the Kentucky courts have
not made such a distinction. Thus, although this article speaks primarily of grants, it is
applicable to reservations as well.
See Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976). ("Any
deed of minerals carries with it the right to use as much of the surface as may be
reasonably necessary to exploit the minerals .... )
' Act of July 13. 1984, ch. 28, 1984 Ky. Acts 47 (codified at Ky. REv. STAT. §§
381.930 -.945) (Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as KRSI. See infro note 44 for the text of
the statute.
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sources and Environmental Protection Cabinet from issuing any
surface mining permits to persons claiming a right to surface
mine on the basis of the prior interpretation of broad form
deeds. 4 This case raises interesting questions concerning the inter-
pretation of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA),5 but an in-depth discussion of the case
is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article will focus
on the historical background of HB 32 and the constitutional
challenges likely to be made to it.
I. HISTORY OF BROAD FORM DEEDS
The phrase "broad form deed" is a loosely-defined term
applied to certain deeds severing the mineral estate from the
surface estate. The broad form deed is, as its name suggests, a
mere form. Many of these deeds are identical except for partic-
ulars such as names and addresses. Indeed, in some counties
those who acquired mineral rights by use of the broad form
deed ordered specially printed deed books so that county clerks
could simply fill in the blanks with the pertinent information.
6
Nonetheless, it is difficult to definitely recite the terms of the
broad form deed. It is likely that there were several versions of
the broad form deed, and many of the courts interpreting deeds
identified as "broad form" do not recite the terms of the deed
in question. This omission is understandable in light of the great
length of these deeds. The turn-of-the-century draftsmen, bliss-
fully unaware of the more modern concern for brevity, penned
an agonizingly detailed description of the rights conveyed.
7
Akers v. Baldwin, Sec., Nat. Res. & Environ. Protection Cabinet, No. 84-88
(E.D. Ky. filed Feb 28, 1984).
1 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Pub. L. No.
95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1318 (1982)).
Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 400 (Ky. 1968) (Hill, J.,
dissenting).
I An example of a typical broad form deed is set forth in Watson v. Kenlick
Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974). The deed at issue in that case conveyed:
[AIiI coal minerals and mineral substances and products; all oils and gases;
all salt and salt mineral waters; all fire and potters clay; all iron and iron
ores; all stone; all slate; all ores and mines; and all subterranean substances
and products; and all combinations of same, or any or all of the same;
situated, lying and being in, on or under the hereinafter described land, or
that may hereafter be found thereon, therein or thereunder; and such of
the standing timber thereupon as may, at any time of the use thereof, be,
[Vol. 1:57
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Typically, these deeds convey all minerals including a number
of substances specifically named in each deed. They further
or by the party of the second part, its successors or assigns, be deemed
necessary or convenient for mining purposes, or so deemed necessary or
convenient for the exercise and enjoyment of any or all the property, rights
and privileges herein bargained, sold, granted or conveyed, including timber
necessary for dams and railroads, or branch lines thereof, as may hereafter
be constructed upon the said lands; and the exclusive rights-of-way for any
and all railroads, tram roads, haul roads and other ways, pipe lines,
telephone and telegraph lines that may hereafter be located on said land
by the parties of the first part, their heirs, representatives or assigns, or
by the party of the second part, its successors or assigns, or by any person
or corporation with or without the authority of either of said parties, their,
or its heirs, representatives, successors or assigns; and also the right to
maintain, keep in repair and operate the same and said railroads, tram
roads, haul roads, ways, pipe lines, telephone and telegraph lines; and also
the exclusive right to enter upon said land and drill thereupon for oil and
gas, and to pump for and store the same upon said land, and remove pipe
and transport the same therefrom; and to use and operate the said land
and surface thereof and any and all parts thereof, including the right to
use, divert, dam and pollute water courses thereon in any and every manner
that may, by party to the second part, its successors or assigns, be deemed
necessary or convenient for the full and free exercise and enjoyment of
any and all the property, rights and privileges hereby bargained, sold,
granted or conveyed, including, but not limiting to, that of drilling, mining,
pumping and therefrom removing or otherwise utilizing the said pipe,
telegraph and telephone lines, rights-of-way, roads, ways, timber, coal,
minerals, slate, oil, gas, saltwater, clay, iron ore, mines, stone and subter-
ranean substances and products thereof, and any and all property and
rights hereby bargained, sold, granted or conveyed, and for the transpor-
tation therefrom of said articles; and also the right to build, erect, alter,
repair, maintain and operate upon said land, and at its option to therefrom
remove, any and all houses, shops, buildings, tanks, derricks, inclines,
tipples, dams, cokeovens, store and ware rooms, and machinery and mining
and any and all equipment, that may, by party of the second part, its
successors or assigns, be deemed necessary or convenient for the full and
free exercise and enjoyment of any and all the property, rights and privi-
leges hereby bargained, granted, sold or conveyed; and the right to there-
upon convert, reduce, refine, store, dump and manufacture the said, or
any or all of said property, or products, in, upon or under said land, or
other land owned, or hereafter acquired by said party of the second part,
its successors or assigns, by purchase, lease or otherwise; and the right to
dump, store and leave upon said land any and all muck, bone, shale, water
or other refuse from said mines, wells, ovens or houses; and any and all
matters and products that may be excavated from mines or produced by
the exercise or enjoyment of any or all the property, rights and privileges
hereby bargained, sold, granted or conveyed; and the right to remove all
pillars and other lateral and subjacent supports without leaving pillars to
support the roof or surface; and the right to use said land for removal or
storage of the products taken out of any other land owned, or hereafter
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convey such surface rights as the grantee may deem "necessary
or convenient for the full and free exercise and enjoyment" of
the mineral rights conveyed.8 The deed may specifically give the
mineral owner the right to remove all pillars and other lateral
and subjacent support. Some deeds contain an express waiver
of liability for the grantee's use of the land and surface. 9 Finally,
the deeds generally reserve to the grantor only such surface rights
as are "consistent with the rights conveyed to the grantee."' 0
It is important to note that each deed must, of course, be
interpreted according to its own terms and, if ambiguous, ac-
cording to the facts surrounding its execution. Thus the cases
that have interpreted certain broad form deeds to include the
right to strip mine are not strictly applicable to any but identical
deeds. Indeed, several recent cases have affirmed that a severance
deed must contain a "definite enlargement of specified mining
rights" in order to effectively grant the right to strip mine."
Unfortunately, the cases interpreting broad form deeds do not
clearly specify the language from which the right to surface mine
arises.' 2 It is often difficult, therefore, to determine whether a
particular non-broad form deed grants the right to surface mine.
This question is beyond the scope of this article, which will use
the term "broad form deed" in reference to those deeds which
have been held to include the right to strip mine.
acquired by party of the second part, its sucessors [sic] or assigns by lease
or otherwise; and the right to erect upon said land and maintain, use,
repair and operate, and at their pleasure remove therefrom, any and all
buildings and structures, and machinery and mining and any and all
equipment, whether specifically enumerated herein or not, that may, by
party of the second part, its successors or assigns, be deemed necessary or
convenient for the exercise or enjoyment of any or all the property, rights
and privileges herein bargained, sold, granted or conveyed; and also the
free access to, upon and over said land for the purpose of surveying and
prospecting for said property and interests.
Id. at 1185-86.
See supra note 7.
See, e.g., Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956) (absent malicious
destruction).
Id. at 43.
See Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1976); see
also Peabody Coal Co. v. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1971) and Peabody Coal Co.
v. Erwin, 453 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1971).
,1 See, e.g., Commerce Union Bank, 540 S.W.2d at 863.
(Vol. 1:57
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The history of these broad form deeds is, to a large extent,
the story of one man, John C. C. Mayo, who was born in 1864
to a poor Pike County farming family but became the richest
and most powerful coal baron of his time.' 3 At a time when a
college education was practically unheard of in Kentucky's hill
country, Mayo managed to attend Kentucky Wesleyan College
at Millersburg. There, Mayo studied geology and learned for the
first time of eastern Kentucky's wealth of mineral resources.
After graduation, Mayo formed a trading company for the
purpose of acquiring minerals. With $450 in capital, Mayo began
a process of acquisition that would ultimately entitle him to
hundreds of thousands of acres of minerals in Eastern Ken-
tucky, 
1 4
Mayo rarely bought land outright, preferring instead to ac-
quire just the minerals, using broad form deeds that he prepared.
This left the surface owner with the right to use the property
for agricultural purposes consistent with the grant of minerals,
as well as the responsibility for all property taxes. The minerals
alone were not, at that time, subject to taxation.
The first Kentucky cases interpreting these deeds did so in
the context of deep mine operations. They established the general
principal that broad form deeds were effective to grant extraor-
dinarily broad surface rights to the mineral owner. For instance,,
in McIntire v. Marian Coal Company, 5 Kentucky's highest court
was confronted with the question of the right of the grantee
under a broad form deed to build structures on the surface. The
court stated:
" See H. CAUDILL, THEIRS BE THE POWER 57-67 (1983).
" Id. According to Caudill, Mayo's methods were simple and effective:
He combed through the deed books in county courthouses, identified the
landowners with the best semblance of titles, and compared their holdings
against his notes made in the Kentucky Wesleyan College library. Where
titles to valuable minerals appeared worth the risk, he approached a land-
owner (who Mayo generally viewed as a mere squatter) and offered him
50C or $1.00 for an option to buy the minerals underlying his land. The
option or "agreement to purchase" was for a term of several years and
provided for ultimate payments from 50C to $5.00 or $6.00 per acre. Almost
all farmers were eager to execute the options. They signed their names (or,
in most instances, affixed their marks) and prayed that Mayo could raise
the purchase money within the time specified.
Id. at 61.
" 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921).
1985]
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Undoubtedly, under the plain terms of the deed, the Marion
Coal Company has the right and could by showing the neces-
sity of convenience thereof use and occupy the whole surface
of the land in question even to exclude the plaintiff and taking
his house and garden, but such taking would have to be after
satisfaction of adjudged compensation for such improvements,
which is but another way of saying that the mineral estate
under the deed is dominant, superior, and exclusive in every
circumstance or condition where the owner thereof shall deem
it necessary or convenient to make such use of the surface as
the deed allows.' 6
Buchanan v. Watson,' 7 decided in 1956, was the first Ken-
tucky case to squarely face the question of whether the broad
form deeds authorized strip mining. The court there held that
the deed in question did permit strip mining, and further, that
the mineral owner would not be liable for damages caused to
the surface unless he acted "oppressively, arbitrarily, wantonly,
or maliciously."' 8 Buchanan is generally cited as the seminal case
on this point, but interestingly, the court's opinion in that case
purports to do nothing more than apply settled law, relying on
earlier cases involving deep mining, such as McIntire.
Almost from its inception, the Buchanan rule came under
strong, sometimes visceral, criticism. Surface owners have com-
plained that the rule unfairly deprives them of their land. In
many cases, these surface owners have lived for generations on
a particular tract of land, claiming it as their own. It is not
uncommon for surface owners to be unaware of a prior mineral
reservation in their chain of title. Their first notice of the mineral
owners' claim may be when the strip mining begins. Further-
more, under previous court holdings, surface owners' homes
could arguably be bulldozed into the ground, provided that the
mineral owners' operators were not acting in a manner that was
"arbitrary, wanton, or malicious." 9
Despite such criticism, the Kentucky courts have not only
consistently upheld Buchanan, but have expanded its reach as
I ld. at 300.
7 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
' Id. at 43.
,9 See e.g., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960); Martin
v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
[Vol. 1:57/
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well. Subsequent cases have held that broad form deeds permit
the mineral owner to employ the auger mining method as well
as the strip mining method; 20 and to strip mine even in cases in
which the coal could have been mined by other methods. 2' In
Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co.,22 the court held that the
owner of minerals under either a grant or a reservation of
minerals had the right to strip or auger mine, and would not be
liable for damages caused thereby unless the mining was carried
on in an "arbitrary, wanton and malicious manner." Croley is
also significant because the reservation of minerals in that case
did not contain a waiver of damage clause such as that which
was present in Buchanan and other earlier cases. Thus the court
in Croley, rather than distinguishing the case's factual situation
based on the lack of a waiver of damages clause, chose instead
to extend Buchanan's rule to include reservations of minerals as
well.
Still, the foes of the Buchanan rule continued to seek some
relief in the Kentucky courts. In 1968, Martin v. Kentucky Oak
Mining Co. ,21 presented the state's highest court with an oppor-
tunity to reevaluate Buchanan. The issue was briefed thoroughly
by both parties and also by a number of amici curiae, including
the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union, the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, the Appalachian Group to Save The Land And People,
Inc., the Kentucky Members of the National Council of Coal
Lessors, Inc., the Sierra Club, and the Big Sandy-Elkhorn Op-
erators Association.
Martin is interesting in its treatment of the arguments voiced
against the Buchanan rule. The surface owners and their allies
essentially argued that the parties to the mineral deeds could not
reasonably have intended to permit strip mining. They pointed
0 Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith, 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960) (permitting a mineral
owner to auger mine when other methods were available even if it meant destruction of
trees and land, as long as the mining was not carried on in an arbitrary, wanton or
malicious manner).
11 See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960) (holding that
where deed granted mineral owner the right to use the surface in any manner that might
be deemed to be necessary, any property damage to trees or surface caused by the
exercise of that right was not actionable since the activity was not arbitrary, wanton or
malicious).
22 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964).
11 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968).
19851
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out that strip mining results not merely in the "use" of the
surface, but in its "destruction" as well.24 There would be little
point to the land owners retaining surface title if it could be
rendered worthless by the mineral owner. Finally, they asserted
that strip mining was unknown at the time of the execution of
these deeds.
In rejecting these arguments, the court stated: "Whether or
not the parties actually contemplated or envisioned strip or auger
mining is not important-the question is whether they intended
that the mineral owners' rights to use the surface in removal of
the minerals would be superior to any competing right of the
surface owner." 2' In that regard, the court recited a number of
facts concerning the execution of the broad form deeds:
In 1900 only 17 percent of the land in Knott was improved
agricultural land. A great percentage of the land (as was the
case with the 90-acre tract of which the Martin parcel was a
part) was hillside land of no productive value. The average
value per acre of land in Knott County (in 1900) was only
$2.90 per acre. The predecessors in title to the Martin land
were paid $3.00 per acre in 1905 for the mineral rights only.
26
The fact that so little of the land in Knott County was
improved agricultural land indicates that the grantors of the
broad form deeds may have been relatively unconcerned about
surface destruction. Moreover, inasmuch as the land owners
appear to have been paid close to the full value of their land
for the mineral rights alone, it is reasonable to assume that they
retained the bare surface title for whatever value it had. Indeed,
it is difficult to argue that the surface owners retained nothing
of value, since even under the Buchanan rule they had unre-
stricted rights in the surface for many years, and will again have
unrestricted surface rights following the strip mining. Of course,
not all grantors under broad form deeds received as much as
$3.00 per acre.
The landowners in Martin argued that strip mining was
unknown at the time the broad form deeds were executed, a
' ld. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 398 (emphasis in original).
[V l. 1:57
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point on which there is some dispute. 27 The court pointed out,
however, that even customary deep mining methods resulted in
some surface destruction, although obviously not as extensive as
in the case of strip mining.u Accordingly, as it appeared that
the parties to the broad form deeds probably did contemplate
at least some surface destruction and were paid for substantially
all the value of the combined surface and mineral estates, the
court held that the plain meaning of the language contained in
the broad form deeds was controlling, and should be given
effect.29 The Buchanan rule was thus upheld. Additionally, the
landowners in Martin argued that the mineral owners should be
estopped from strip or auger mining in any area where they have
permitted the surface owner to make improvements. However,
the court rejected this argument on the ground that it was
essentially unreasonable to expect the owner of thousands of
acres of mineral property to keep track of any improvements
made on the land and to notify the improver that his rights were
subordinate to those of the mineral owner.30
The trial court in Martin had constructed, apparently out of
whole cloth, a Solomonic solution to the broad form deed prob-
lem by ruling that, although the broad form deeds gave the
mineral owner the right to strip and auger mine, the mineral
owner should be obligated to pay damages for destruction of
the surface caused by such operations." Although such a solu-
tion may have had fairness to recommend it, it found no support
in any case law, and the appellate court in Martin rejected it,
saying:
It appears to us that if, as we in substance are holding, the
mineral owner bought and paid for the right to destroy the
surface in a good faith exercise of the right to remove the
minerals, then there is no basis upon which there could rest
an obligation to pay damages for exercising that right.32
2, See Comment, Broad-Form Deed - Obstacle to Peaceful Coexistence Between
Mineral and Surface Owners, 60 Ky. L.J. 742 (1971-72).
Martin, 429 S.W.2d at 398.
SId.
SId.
" Id. at 396.
" Id. at 399 ("except of course for arbitrary, wanton or malicious acts").
1985]
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Judge Hill, dissenting, pointed out that many broad form
deeds were essentially forms, prepared and filled in by the gran-
tee." Accordingly, the common law rule that a deed is to be
construed most strongly against the grantor is arguably not
applicable in these casts. Further, inasmuch as strip mining was
allegedly unknown at the time of the execution of the deeds,
and is so much more destructive of the surface than deep mining,
the deeds in question should not be read so as to permit strip
mining. In this regard, the dissent cites Wiser Oil Co. v. Con-
ley, 34 which held that the owner of oil and gas rights had no
right to-use the water-flooding method of recovering oil without
the consent of the owner of the surface. Judge Hill noted that
in Wiser, the court stated:
Even though appellants assert that the water-flooding process
was known prior to March 10, 1917, the date of execution of
the lease, and was employed to some extent in other states
before that time, we conclude it was the intention of the parties
that the oil should be produced , by drilling in the customary
manner that prevailed when the lease was executed. Any ex-
emption from liability would therefore be limited to the dam-
ages which might be caused by this contemplated means of
bringing oil to the top."
The majority in Martin made some attempt to distinguish Wiser,
but ultimately decided "to adhere to Buchanan whether or not
it conflicts with Wiser.' '36 To the dissent, however, Wiser and
Buchanan were "as inconsistent as sin and salvation.
' 37
Despite the diverse positions taken by the majority and the
dissent in Martin, it was obvious that this case represented a
negative response to the well-framed arguments made by the
large variety of interested parties. Accordingly, it became evident
that to change the interpretation of broad form deeds, a new
approach was needed. One such approach was advanced in
Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co. 38 The plaintiff in Watson argued
that Buchanan's construction of broad form deeds constituted a
Id. at 400 (Hill, J., dissenting).
346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960).
Id. at 721-22 (emphasis in original).
Martin, 429 S.W.2d at 399.
" Id. at 402 (Hill, J., dissenting).
' 498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1012 (1975).
[Vol. i1:57
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taking of private property in violation of the United States
Constitution. 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed,
and the United States Supreme Court denied an application for
certiorari, despite a spirited dissent by Justice Douglas.
4
0
Another approach taken by the- surface owners and their
supporters was a legislative attack. They secured passage of
legislation4' requiring that an application for a strip mining
permit be accompanied by a statement of consent signed by each
holder of a freehold interest in the land. Thus, a mineral owner,
even though he may have had the right to strip mine under his
deed, would have been unable to obtain a permit without the
consent of the surface owner. In effect, this statute gave the
surface owner the power to veto strip mining. In Department
for Natural Resources & Environmental Protection v. No. 8
Ltd. ,42 Kentucky's highest court struck down the statute as un-
constitutional, stating: "It is beyond cavil that the primary pur-
pose and effect of Subsection 8 is to change the relative legal
rights and economic bargaining positions of many private parties
under their contracts rather than acheive any public purpose. It
is, therefore, axiomatic that Subsection 8 is unconstitutional. ' 43
Thus, the stage was set for yet another legislative attempt to
undo the interpretation of broad form deeds developed by the
courts in Buchanan and its progeny.
II. HousE Biu. 32
Basically, HB 3244 provides that any instrument purporting
to sever the surface and mineral estates that fails to state in
Watson, 498 F.2d at 1186.
Watson, 422 U.S. at 1012 (Douglas, J., dissenting in the denial of certiorari).
KRS § 350.060(2) (1974) (effective Jan. I, 1975).
- 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975).
' Id. at 686-87.
Act of July 13, 1984, ch.28, 1984 Ky. Acts 47 (codified at KRS § 381.930 - .945
(Supp. 1984)). The chapter reads in part as follows:
381.930 Purposes of KRS 381.935 to 381.945 - The purposes of KRS
381.935 to 381.945 are as follows:
(1) To facilitate and require the demonstration of a clear understand-
ing between the owners of surface and mineral estates in land concerning
their respective rights to use and -occupy or injure the surface of the land;
(2) To protect the security of titles to land and improvements thereto;
(3) To promote the free alienability of land;
(4) To prevent hardship and injustice to surface or mineral owners
19851
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express terms the methods of mining permitted shall be held,
"in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the con-
trary, ' 45 to grant rights to mine only by such methods "of coal
extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the
area affected at the time the instrument was executed."6 It is
obvious that this statute is aimed primarily at prohibiting surface
mining under broad form deeds, particularly those which were
executed in the latter part of the nineteenth or early part of the
twentieth centuries when strip mining as currently practiced was
arising from uncertainty of the law;
(5) To promote the conservation and the full and efficient use of all
natural resources of the state, including the land, the making of improve-
ments to the land, the growth of agriculture, the development of new
industry and the general economic well-being of the state and its people;
(6) To codify a rule of construction for mineral deeds relating to coal
extraction so as to implement the intention of the parties at the time the
instrument was created; and
(7) To foster certainty and uniformity in the operation of the law.
381.935 Definitions - For the purpose of KRS 381.940, "method" and
"methods" mean underground, surface, auger, or open pit mining and
nothing in KRS 381.940 shall be interpreted to adversely affect the use of
modern equipment or machinery with respect to mining methods permitted
under KRS 381.940.
381.940 Rules of construction for mineral deeds relating to coal extraction
- In any instrument heretofore or hereafter executed purporting to sever
the surface and mineral estates or to grant a mineral estate or to grant a
right to extract minerals, which fails to state or describe in express and
specific terms the method of coal extraction to be employed, or where said
instrument contains language subordinating the surface estate to the mineral
estate, it shall be held, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary, that the intention of the parties to the instrument was that
the coal be extracted only by the method or methods of commercial coal
extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected
at the time the instrument was executed, and that the mineral estate be
dominant to the surface estate only for the purposes of coal extraction by
the method or methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known
to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument
was executed.
381.945 Written agreement in deed directing how surface to be reclaimed
- In any deed in which the minerals are severed from the surface, the
present owners of the surface rights may enter into a written agreement
directing how the surface shall be reclaimed, and how the property shall
be left after the extraction of the minerals, and in compliance with federal
and state rules and regulations.
KRS § 381.940 (Supp. 1984).
- ld.
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unknown. It is not entirely clear what is intended by the phrase
"clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. ' 47 Certainly this
would allow a court to consider language in a deed which,
although not explicitly mentioning surface mining, indicates that
the parties contemplated extraordinary, then-unknown mining
methods. It is less clear, however, whether a mineral owner may
introduce extrinsic evidence concerning the circumstances sur-
rounding the execution of the deed of severance in support of
his claim that the deed grants surface mining rights. 48 Moreover,
it is doubtful that anything less than evidence of a thorough
discussion of the possibility of strip mining and resultant surface
destruction would suffice to alter the construction legislatively
imposed by HB 32. Since strip mining as known today did not
exist then, it is highly unlikely that any such conversations
occurred. For all intents and purposes then, the presumption
mandated by HB 32 is irrebuttable, at least as regards nineteenth
century severance deeds.
In cases involving more recent severance deeds, HB 32 may
have entirely unexpected consequences. As mentioned earlier,
recent cases have held that a severance deed that does not contain
a "definite enlargement of specified mining rights" does not
grant the right to strip mine. 49 The mineral owner claiming under
such a deed executed recently could reasonably argue that HB
32 actually expands his mining rights. Since the deed fails to
state expressly the mining methods to be used, HB 32 gives rise
to a presumption that "the intention of the parties to the in-
strument was that coal be extracted only by the method or
methods of commercial coal extraction commonly known to be
in use in Kentucky in the area affected at the time the instrument
was executed," 50 which presumably would include surface min-
" For a discussion of the stated and implied purposes of HB 32, see infra text
accompanying notes 126-27. See also KRS § 381.930 (Supp. 1984) supra note 44.
1 Such extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible to explain or supplement the
provisions of a deed or other writing unless the written instrument is ambiguous. See
Luigart v. Federal Parquatry Mfg. Co., 228 S.W. 758 (Ky. 1922). Neither Buchanan
nor Watson clearly finds the broad form deed to be ambiguous, but both appear to
consider extrinsic evidence. In any case, the difficulty of producing credible extrinsic
evidence concerning a severance deed executed eighty or ninety years ago is overwhelm-
ing.
" See supra note I I and accompanying text.
KRS § 381.940 (Supp. 1984).
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ing. The use of the word "only" may indicate that HB 32 is
intended solely to restrict, rather than to enlarge, mining rights.
Such a construction makes the presumption mandated by HB 32
appear more arbitrary, however, and thus may create constitu-
tional problems.
Another problem of construction presented by HB 32 con-
cerns the meaning of the phrase "method or methods of com-
mercial coal extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky
in the area affected at the time the instrument was executed."s
The language raises several questions. Must the mining method
have been in use in the local area, or is it sufficient that it was
in use somewhere in Kentucky? Who must have known of its
use? The mining industry? The general populace of the local
area, or of the state? What effect should a particular grantor's
knowledge or lack of knowledge of mining practices have on
interpretation of his deed? These questions remain to be an-
swered by the courts that must apply HB 32. The legislature's
failure to adequately deal with these questions suggests that the
statute was aimed primarily or exclusively at nineteenth century
severance deeds, and that the function of the "presumption"
raised by the Act is simply to deprive the mineral owner of the
right to surface mine. This perceived purpose differs from that
which is stated in the Act, and, as discussed further below," the
true purpose of the Act may be important in determining its
constitutionality.
If upheld, HB 32 will have a tremendous impact on the
development of coal resources in Eastern Kentucky: it will un-
doubtedly discourage development since the effect of the bill is
to shift from the mineral owner to the surface owner the control
over which methods may be used to mine coal on hundreds of
thousands of acres. The surface owner therefore is given a veto
power over the strip mining of coal. In areas where coal may
be economically mined only by the surface mining method, the
result of HB 32 may be to prevent production altogether.
HB 32, of course, will have no effect on the strip mining of
lands where the minerals and surface are owned by the same
party, or where the minerals have been severed under a deed or
" Id.
See infra text accompanying note I 11.
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reservation which specifically grants the right to strip mine, or
where mineral owners have prudently acquired leases from the
surface owners specifically granting the mineral owner the right
to strip mine. HB 32 thus offers little comfort to those who
oppose strip mining on environmental grounds because it does
not prohibit surface mining in those cases mentioned above.
Furthermore, even where HB 32 does apply, it is likely that the
mineral owner will be willing to pay the surface owner whatever
he demands in order to exploit the minerals under the surface.
Therefore, the ultimate result will be that much of the land will
be strip mined anyway, but at a higher cost to the operator.
The extensive regulatory scheme concerning surface mining
is unaffected by HB 32 and will remain applicable to all such
mining regardless of how the operator acquired his rights. HB
32 contains a rather cryptic section dealing with reclamation,
which reads as follows:
In any deed in which the minerals are severed from the surface,
the present owners of the surface rights may enter into a
written agreement directing how the surface shall be reclaimed,
and how the property shall be left after the extraction of the
minerals, and in compliance with federal and state rules and
regulations .
3
It is not immediately obvious what the legislature intended by
this section. It is a generally accepted principle of real property
law that a grantor of an interest in property is free to make
such conditions of his grant, consistent with applicable laws, as
he deems proper.Y Thus, it would appear that a landowner
severing the minerals to his property could impose any addi-
tional, consistent reclamation requirements on the mineral owner
that he wished. He cannot , of course, relieve the mineral owner
of any reclamation requirements imposed upon him by law."
This section of the bill may have simply been intended to codify
this general rule of property law.
Prior to its passage, HB 32 was questioned on constitutional
grounds. Its authors were apparently aware of these problems
" KRS § 381.945 (Supp. 1984)).
- See R. POWELL AND P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 670-79 (1983).
" Id. at 679[4J.
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and attempted to avoid them by careful construction.5 6 None-
theless, serious questions as to the constitutionality of HB 32
remain to be resolved. Indeed, at this writing, several cases are
pending which challenge HB 32's validity. 7 The bill is consti-
tutionally suspect on at least four grounds: first, that it results
in a "taking" of private property without just compensation;
second, that it impairs the obligation of contracts; third, that it
constitutes a usurpation of the duties and responsibilities of the
court system by the legislature; and finally, that the presumption
mandated by the statute is, in fact, irrebuttable, and as such
denies the mineral owners due process of law. Each of these
contentions will be examined in turn.
III. THE "TAKING" QUESTION
Both the federal and Kentucky constitutions contain essen-
tially identical provisions prohibiting the state from "taking"
private property without just compensation." There does not
appear to be any appreciable difference between the interpreta-
tions given the two sections. Accordingly, the following discus-
sion will focus on federal decisions.
Any discussion of taking as it relates to HB 32 must begin
with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.59 Pennsylvania Coal
involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute forbidding the
mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsid-
ence of dwellings or certain other structures. In an opinion by
Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania
statute worked a "taking" without due compensation.6 In
5 HB 32 is practically identical to a Tennessee statute, TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-
511 (Supp. 1980) (currently codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-102 (1982)). The
constitutionality of this statute was upheld in Doochin v. Rackley, 610 S.W.2d 715
(Tenn. 1981) (see infra notes 175-181 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
case). It would appear that the drafters of HB 32 used the Tennessee Act as a model.
" See, e.g., Baker v. Wooten. No. 83-CI-429 (Perry Cir. Ct. filed April 3, 1985);
Akers v. Baldwin, Sec., Nat. Res. & Environ. Protection Cabinet, No. 84-88 (E.D. Ky.
filed Feb. 28, 1985).
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V with Ky. CO NST. § 13.
5' 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
The Pennsylvania statute under review was P.L. 1198, commonly known in
Pennsylvania as the Kohler Act. The statute forbade the mining of anthracite coal in
any manner which would cause subsidence of any structure used as a human dwelling.
The statute clearly destroyed previously existing rights of property and contract. Penn-
sylvania Coal. 260 U.S. at 412-13.
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Holmes' view, most, if not all, governmental regulations produce
some adverse effect on individual property rights.6 ' A state may
not, however, totally escape the effect of the taking clause by
describing its action as a mere regulation. The question becomes
one of delineating between those state regulations that, although
adversely affecting some property interest, are nonetheless valid
without compensation, and those state actions that, although
justified as valid regulations, nonetheless effect a deprivation of
property rights constituting a "taking. ' 62 In drawing this line,
Holmes focused on the extent of the diminution in property
rights and concluded that the Pennsylvania Act had the effect
of making the mining of certain coal commercially impractical,
and, "[tio make it commercially impracticable to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it.
'
"63
Pennsylvania Coal is important not merely for its holding,
but also because it deals with a question closely analogous to
that presented by HB 32. The Pennsylvania Act, like HB 32,
attempted to regulate a dispute between mineral owners and
surface owners. 4 In overturning the Pennsylvania act, the Court
was mindful that the Pennsylvania legislature had apparently
concluded that the mining in question was injurious to public
health, safety and welfare, and that this conclusion may well
have been a reasonable one. But,
[T]he question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes
desired should fall. So far as private persons or communities
have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights,
we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger
warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought.
65
' ld. at 413.
Id.
" Id. at 414.
' The surface owners in Pennsylvania had, for the most part, conveyed away their
rights to subjacent support by instruments similar to the broad form deeds dealt with
by HB 32. Had they not done so, the mineral owner presumably would have been liable
for any subsidence under general principles of property law. Pennsylvania Coal, 260
U.S. at 414.
11 Id. at 416.
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Justice Brandeis, in dissent, would have upheld the act, since
the prohibited mining was in the nature of a public nuisance.66
As such, Pennsylvania's attempt to abate the nuisance, although
undoubtedly working some hardship on the mineral owners,
would not constitute a taking. "Restriction upon use does not
become inappropriate as a means, merely because it deprives the
owner of the only use to which the property can then be prof-
itably put."167 Thus, the dissent focuses more strongly on the
character of the activity sought to be regulated, while Holmes'
analysis gives greater weight to the extent of diminution in the
plaintiff's property. 61
Although the Court has never overruled Pennsylvania Coal,
it has nonetheless backed away from Justice Holmes' analysis.
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,69 the Court upheld an
ordinance which was apparently applicable only to the appel-
lant's mining operation and which would prevent any further
mining on their property, thereby making the property worthless.
After stating the general principle that some governmental reg-
ulation is permissible without compensation under the state's
police power, even though that regulation may work to prohibit
a beneficial use to which the property had previously been de-
voted, the Court went on to explain that Justice Holmes' dimi-
nution-in-value test was only one part of its analysis.'0 The Court
implied that the validity of an ordinance would turn on its
reasonableness, which is based on such factors as, "the nature
of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and
effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss
which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordi-
nance." 7 ' It is possible to construe this analysis as mere dicta,
however, since the Court goes on to hold that the appellants
had failed to meet their burden on the issue of reasonableness.7
2
Apparently, there was no evidence produced at trial as to dim-
inution in value of the property.
Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In the words of Justice Brandeis, the statute
merely prohibited a "noxious use."
Id. at 418 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 413.
369 U.S. 590 (1962).
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Several cases arising under the taking clause have focused
on the question of whether the government's action constitutes
an actual physical invasion or appropriation of the property.
For instance, in United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,73
the Supreme Court reviewed a War Production Board order
requiring nonessential gold mines to cease operating, and decided
that the order was not a violation of the taking clause because
"the Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner take
physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment con-
nected with them." ' 74 On the other hand, when the challenged
governmental action does constitute a physical invasion of the
property, the Court is more willing to find a taking, even though
the economic effect on the owner is minimal. In Loretto v.
Teleprompter of Manhattan CA TV Corp.," the Court struck
down a New York law requiring landlords to permit installation
of cable television equipment on rental property even though
the infringement was admittedly minor. 76 The Court concluded
that, "a permanent physical occupation authorized by govern-
ment is a taking without regard to the public interest that it may
serve."
77
Although the Court in these recent cases focused on the
character of the governmental action, it has not abandoned the
approach of Pennsylvania Coal. In 1978, the Court reviewed its
decisions concerning the taking clause in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City, 78 and concluded that it "has
been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.'' 9
Thus, the outcome in any particular case depends on all the
357 U.S. 155 (1958).
' Id. at 165-66.
" 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
The equipment in question consisted of about 30 feet of 1/2" cable and two 4'
x 4" x 4" metal boxes.
" Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
" 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the Court upheld a New York City
ordinance that provided a procedure for designating buildings as "landmarks," thereafter
restricting the use of such buildings. As a result of the ordinance, the owner of Grand
Central Terminal was prevented from constructing a 55-story office building above the
terminal.
"7 Id. at 124.
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facts and circumstances of that case. 0 It was apparent that,
although the Court continued to honor Justice Holmes' ap-
proach in Pennsylvania Coal, it gave the "character of the
governmental action" predominant consideration.
The effect of HB 32 is unlike any of the governmental actions
previously discussed. Rather than merely restricting one's right
to use his property in a certain way or actually expropriating
the property, HB 32 takes a particular quill from the bundle of
rights constituting ownership of property-the right to strip
mine-and transfers it from one individual to another. Since, in
a strict sense, mining rights are pertinent to the ownership of
the coal, one might object to this characterization, finding it
absurd to speak of transferring mining rights to one who does
not own the coal. Nonetheless, under HB 32 the surface owner
does control these rights even if he does not, in fact, possess
them. It would perhaps be more accurate therefore to say that
HB 32 takes an affirmative easement away from the mineral
owner and creates a corresponding negative easement in the
surface owner.
The situation may be somewhat analogous to that presented
by Loretto, where the challenged law essentially transferred an
easement from the landlords to the cable company."1 HB 32,
however, differs from the statute challenged in Loretto in two
important respects: under HB 32, there is no "permanent phys-
ical occupation," and in many cases the diminution in value of
the property may be substantial. For those tracts of land which
may be mined economically only by the surface mining method,
depriving the mineral owner holding under a broad form deed
" As the Court noted:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's
decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations .... So, too,
is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may more readily
be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good.
Id.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. The statute under review was N.Y. EXEC. LAw §
828(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
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of the right to mine greatly decreases the value of the property-
perhaps even to the point of making it totally worthless.
There is some language in Penn Central, however, that sug-
gests that such considerations may be inappropriate. Although
the owner in Penn Central argued that an ordinance deprived it
of gainful use of its "air rights" above the Grand Central
Terminal and thus constituted a "taking," the Court upheld the
ordinance, saying:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discreet segments and attempt to determine whether rights in
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel
as a whole-here, the city tax block designated as the "land-
mark site."
'8 2
The Court's reasoning could easily be applied to negate a
HB 32 "taking" challenge: HB 32 works no diminution in the
value of the property "as a whole," since the stripping rights
are merely displaced from the owner of one interest to the owner
of another. However, such an argument ignores some important
economic realities and is probably a misreading of Penn Central.
To have allowed the plaintiffs in Penn Central to evaluate the
diminution in the value of their "air space," separately from
the value of their remaining interest would exaggerate the total
diminution. No such exaggeration occurs in a case in which the
loss of surface mining rights makes the coal owned by the
mineral owners economically unmineable. It is instead the dim-
inution in value of the mineral estate "as a whole" that should
be considered, and in certain cases this may be quite substantial.
In a recent Supreme Court case, Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 3 the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Indiana Mineral Lapse
Act,8 4 which provided that a severed mineral interest that is not
used for a period of twenty years automatically lapses and reverts
to the current surface owner of the property unless the mineral
': Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
454 U.S. 516 (1982).
IND. CODE §§ 32-5-11-1 to -8 (1976) (entitled the Dormant Mineral Interests
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owner files a statement of claim in the local county recorder's
office. Texaco and others claimed, among other things, that the
statute effected a taking of private property for public use with-
out just compensation." The Court noted that property interests
were not created by the United States Constitution, but rather
were created and defined by state law.86 Once having been cre-
ated, they are entitled to some constitutional protection, but
"just as a State may create a property interest that is entitled to
constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition
the permanent retention of that property right on the perform-
ance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention
to retain the interest.1 8 7 The Court found that Indiana had not
exercised its power in an arbitrary manner. 8 Indeed, "[i]t is the
owner's failure to make any use of the property-and not the
action of the State-that causes the lapse of the property right;
there is no 'taking' that requires compensation. " 9 The Court
similarly dismissed arguments that the statute constituted an
unconstitutional impairment of contracts, 90 or that lack of prior
notice offended the due process clause. 91
Short is especially relevant to the issue presented by HB 32
since the case seeks to adjust the property rights between the
mineral and surface owner. It is, however, distinguishable on at
least three grounds. Under the Indiana statute, 9 the owner of a
severed mineral interest could protect that interest simply by
filing a statement of claim the county recorder's office. The
Kentucky statute has no such saving provision. 93 Indeed, the
holder of a mineral interest under a broad form deed simply no
longer has surface mining rights after the passage of HB 32.
The Court in Short concluded that Indiana had not acted arbi-
trarily; that a state may well conclude that the interest of elim-
inating stale and abandoned claims justified the minimal burden
Short, 454 U.S. at 522.
I d. at 526.
I' d.
I d. at 529.
" d. at 530.
I d. at 531. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
" Short, 454 U.S. at 538.
'- IND. CODE § 32-5-11-4 (1976).
" See KRS §§ 381.930-.945 (Supp. 1984), supra note 44.
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imposed on the owner of the minerals by the act.94 The legislative
rationale which motivated the passage of HB 32 is not as clear,
but it certainly was not the state's interest in eliminating stale
claims: the Kentucky Act applies not only to stale claims, but
to active ones as well. It works to deprive certain mineral owners
of stripping rights whether those rights have been used or not.
Therefore, HB 32 contains no saving provisions whatsoever. 9
The Court in Short simply sidesteps the taking issue by holding
that it is the failure of the mineral owner to register his interest,
and not the action of the state, that results in the extinguishment
of his claim.9 Such is not the case with HB 32 since it is clearly
the action of the legislature in passing HB 32 that deprives
certain mineral owners of their stripping rights. Thus, although
Short may at first appear to be on point, there are many differ-
ences which suggest a different outcome would result from an
HB 32 challenge.
Moreover, the dissent in Short strongly suggests that the four
dissenting Justices would not look kindly upon HB 32: "If
Indiana were by simple fiat to 'extinguish' all preexisting mineral
interests in the State, or to transfer those interests to itself, to
surface owners, or indeed to anyone at all, the action would
surely be unconstitutional and unenforceable-at least absent
just compensation. "97 This hypothetical is nearly identical to
what is presented by HB 32. HB 32 in effect deprives mineral
owners of certain preexisting mineral interests: namely, the right
to surface mine. That right is now contingent upon the consent
of the surface owner. It is true that HB 32 does not apply to
all severed mineral interests-only those that are silent as to the
method of mining-and merely purports to propose a rule of
construction. Indeed, it could be argued that HB 32 does not
transfer any interests at all, but merely gives effect to the inten-
tion of the original parties to broad form deeds. Nonetheless,
the prior judicial interpretation of these deeds has been so long-
standing, and the effect of HB 32 is so sweeping, that it is
difficult to construe its effect other than as a taking.
Short, 454 U.S. at 538.
' See KRS §§ 381.930-.945 (Supp. 1984), supra note 44.
Short, 454 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 542 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Although the applicable precedents are at times confused
and contradictory, taken together they do produce a general
outline of the Court's approach in taking cases. That approach
involves a consideration of both the diminution in value resulting
from challenged governmental action and the nature of that
action. Under this analysis, HB 32 is indeed questionable at best.
Despite the Court's recent reluctance to require compensation
for governmental actions that may be termed "regulatory," the
Court might well see HB 32 in a much different light since HB
32 is not at all regulatory. It does not prevent strip mining nor
does it regulate the reclamation of surface mined land. It simply
redresses what the legislature must have felt was an injustice-a
bad deal for surface owners-by reversing the settled judicial
interpretation of that deal.
IV. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
Another potential constitutional challenge to HB 32 will
doubtless center upon the contract clauses of the United States
and the Kentucky constitutions. Article 1, section 10 of the
United States Constitution provides that, "No state shall ...
pass any . . .Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." 98 The
Kentucky constitution contains a similar provision, similarly in-
terpreted.9
The federal provision was apparently intended to restrain the
states from enacting various forms of debtor relief, which might
work to dry up credit for the emerging nation.' °° Early Supreme
Court decisions, during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure, inter-
preted the clause much more broadly, however. In fact, the
contract clause was for a time the Court's principal weapon to
invalidate state legislation that infringed on private property
rights.'10 Between 1874 and 1898, the contract clause was invoked
in thirty-nine cases to invalidate state legislation. 02 Beginning in
approximately 1898, however, cases decided under the contract
clause began to diminish, in part because the Court began to
- U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
- KY. CONST. § 19.
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rely on the more flexible doctrine of substantive due process to
strike down certain state legislation.103
The contract clause again came to the forefront during the
Great Depression, when several states enacted debtor relief leg-
islation, the constitutionality of which was challenged on con-
tract clause grounds. The first of these cases was Home Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.1°4 In Blaisdell, the Court upheld a
Minnesota statute providing a procedure by which the period of
redemption for mortgages could be extended. 05 In so doing, the
Court noted that despite the seemingly absolute nature of the
contract clause, "the prohibition is not an absolute one and is
not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical for-
mula.' ' 6( Indeed, The Court noted that there are numerous
instances in which states are free to enact legislation, even though
it may literally impair the obligation of some contract. None-
theless:
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation
of that power. The reserved power cannot be construed so as
to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed
to destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They
must be construed in harmony with each other. This principle
precludes a construction which would permit the State to adopt
as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of
contracts or the denial of means to enforce them.'07
In upholding the Minnesota statute, the Court noted five
circumstances that it found significant, the first of which was
the presence of an emergency. 08 The Minnesota legislation ex-
pressly declared the existence of an economic emergency and the
Court found that such declarations "cannot be regarded as a
subterfuge or as lacking in adequate basis."' 9 Second, the leg-
islation was enacted "not for the mere advantage of particular
Id. at 424-25.
, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
The statute under review was the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, MINN.
STAT., ch. 339 (1933).
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individuals but for the protection of a basic interest of soci-
ety." 10 Third, the relief afforded by the statute was appropriate
to the emergency. Fourth, the conditions imposed as a prereq-
uisite to extending the period of redemption appear to be rea-
sonable. And finally, the legislation was a temporary measure,
which by its terms was to expire no later than two years after
its enactment."'
Subsequent cases allowed states even greater latitude in leg-
islatively interfering with contractual expectations. The low water
mark of the contract clause was reached in City of El Paso v.
Simmons."t2 At issue in that case was the constitutionality of a
Texas statute that essentially amended the terms of sale of certain
state land." 3 The State of Texas had sold the land in question
in 1910 under a statute that provided for forfeiture of the land
to the State in the event of nonpayment of interest, but gave
the purchaser or his vendee an unlimited right to reinstate his
claim by paying the full amount of interest due. The statute was
amended in 1941 to limit the right to reinstate to within five
years after the date of forfeiture. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the Texas statute, despite the fact that the contract in
question was between the state and a private party, and would
therefore be subject to stricter scrutiny than would a legislative
infringement upon a purely private contract. The Court reasoned
that since the promise of reinstatement "was not the central
undertaking of the seller nor the primary consideration for the
buyer's undertaking,"" 4 a change in that provision would not
violate the contract clause. Following El Paso, several commen-
tators suggested that the contract clause was dead,' but recently
it has made a surprising recovery.
In 1977, the Supreme Court again used the contract clause
to strike down state legislation in United States Trust Co. v.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 445-47.
379 U.S. 497 (1965).
" The statute under review was 1941 Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws, ch. 191, § 3, TEAX.
STAT. ANN., art. 5326 (Vernon 1941).
' 379 U.S. at 514.
E.g., H. CHASE AND C. DUCAT, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
105 (rev. ed. 1973).
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New Jersey. ' 6 In 1962, the states of New York and New Jersey
had entered into a statutory covenant authorizing the Port Au-
thority of New York and New Jersey to acquire, construct and
operate a railroad, but prohibiting the Port Authority from
subsidizing the railroad with any other income, all of which had
been pledged as security for certain bonds. In 1974, both states
repealed the 1962 covenant, and a trustee and holder of Port
Authority bonds filed suit challenging the constitutionality of
New Jersey's repealing legislation. The Court determined that
by diminishing the security available to the bond holders, the
repealing legislation had impaired contractual obligation of the
states, but noted that, "a finding that there has been a technical
impairment is merely a preliminary step in resolving the more
difficult question whether that impairment is permitted under
the Constitution."1 7 Citing Blaisdell and El Paso, the Court
held that the repeal of the covenant was neither essential nor
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances, and there-
fore was prohibited under the contract clause."' The precedential
value of this case is limited, however, by the fact that it was a
4-3 opinion with Justices Stewart and Powell taking no part in
the case. Moreover, since the contract involved was a public one
and thus subjected to greater scrutiny, it was unclear whether
the case would be extended to statutes infringing on private
contracts.
These limiting factors were effectively removed, however, in
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus. " 9 In that case, the Court
was called upon to decide the constitutionality of a Minnesota
statute which assessed a "pension funding charge" against cer-
tain employers who closed offices within the state. 120 Following
passage of the act, the plaintiff Allied had closed its Minnesota
office in a move planned prior to the act's passage. Pursuant to
the act, the State notified Allied that it owed a pension funding
charge of $185,000. Allied contended that this constituted a
116 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (4-3 decision). The statute under review were 1974 N.J. LAWS,
c. 25 and 1974 N.Y. LAWS, C. 993.
' 431 U.S. at 21.
' Id. at 31.
"' 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
' The statute under review was the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, MINN.
STAT. § 181B.01 (1974).
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violation of the contract clause in that it essentially increased
the appellant's funding obligations under its pension plan. The
Court applied the principles set out in Blaisdell and held the
Minnesota law unconstitutional. ' 2  The Court emphasized that
Allied had no reason to anticipate that its funding obligations
would be increased, and that it had "relied heavily, and reason-
ably, on this legitimate contractual expectation in calculating its
annual contributions to the pension fund."' 2 2 Moreover, since
the law applied only to certain specified employers, it could
"hardly be characterized, like the law at issue in the Blaisdell
case, as one enacted to protect a broad societal interest rather
than a narrow class.1 123 Finally, the Court noted that in enacting
the challenged law, the Minnesota legislature entered a field that
it never before sought to regulate.' 24
Taken together, these cases indicate that the Supreme Court
has recently breathed new life into the contract clause. Although
the Court appears willing to defer to legislative judgments as to
the best method to deal with broad social problems, and to allow
some incidental infringement on contractual rights, the Court
has clearly placed significant limits on legislative impairment of
contracts. It seems unlikely that the Court will soon back down
from the holdings of United States Trust Co. or Spannaus.
2
1
These holdings appear to prohibit the kind of retroactive
adjustment of contract rights mandated by HB 32. HB 32 cannot
be said to have been enacted in response to an emergency, nor
is it of temporary duration. The stated purposes of HB 32 speak
in general terms of the many beneficial consequences expected
to flow to sQciety at large by virtue of the Act's passage. 26 It is
arguable, however, that the true purpose of HB 32 is much more
1-' Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 250.
,2. Id. at 246.
'1' Id. at 249.
I ld. at 234.
Indeed, only three members of the Court (Justices Brennan, White and Marshall)
dissented in each case. The majority opinion in United States Trust Co. was by Black-
mun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.; Stewart and Powell,
JJ. did not participate. In Spannaus, the majority opinion was by Stewart, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens, JJ.; Blackmun, J. did not partic-
ipate. Thus, five of the current justices have aligned themselves with the majority
opinions in either United States Trust Co. or Spannaus. Justice O'Connor, the newest
member of the Court, did not take part in either case.
I- See KRS § 381.930 (Supp. 1984), supra note 44.
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narrow. Given the history surrounding HB 32, it is reasonable
to infer that the true purpose of the Act is simply to adjust the
respective rights between mineral owners and surface owners in
order to reach what the legislature considered to be a more
equitable result. Accordingly, it may well be said that the act is,
in fact, addressed to "the mere advantage of particular individ-
uals," rather than "the protection of a basic interest to soci-
ety.')12
7
The Act speaks of promoting certainty and uniformity in the
operation of the law, and the free alienability of land, but the
effect of the Act may be just the opposite. Prior to the passage
of the Act, an owner of minerals under a broad form deed could
rely upon his right to surface mine. Now he must determine
whether the language of his particular deed states "in express
and specific terms the method of coal extraction to be em-
ployed,' ' 2 and if not, whether strip mining was commonly in
use in that locale at the time the instrument was executed.
Admittedly, the answer to these questions should be relatively
clear for a typical broad form deed executed in the late nine-
teenth century. However, since the presumption mandated by
HB 32 that no stripping rights were intended to be transferred
is rebuttable by "clear and convincing evidence," a mineral
owner may attempt to prove that the parties to the severance
deed intended to permit strip mining. Thus, the question of
whether the mineral owner may surface mine certain land may
be substantially less clear after the passage of HB 32 than before.
Two other factors discussed in Blaisdell also argue against
the constitutionality of HB 32. Since there is no real emergency,
it cannot be said that the relief afforded by the Act is "appro-
priately tailored to the emergency it was designed to meet."' 2 9
Finally, the reasonableness of the conditions imposed by the Act
is open to serious question. Indeed, whether one views HB 32
as reasonable may depend on whether one is a mineral owner
or a surface owner. Just as the plaintiff in Spannaus relied
heavily and reasonably on its legitimate contractual expectation,
so too have both surface and mineral owners made business
decisions based on a reasonable belief that the broad form deed
'1' See supra note I 10 and accompanying text.
, KRS § 381.940 (Supp. 1984).
Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 242.
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included the right to surface mine. They may in fact have
purchased the minerals from someone else in reliance on the
Kentucky cases interpreting the broad form deed as including
the right to strip mine. 130 Most of the mineral and surface
holdings in Eastern Kentucky have changed hands many times
since the original severance deeds. Any such transfers since 1956,
the date of Buchanan, were made with constructive, if not
actual, knowledge of the legal effect of broad form deeds. Both
mineral and surface owners who have acquired their interests
recently probably did so at prices that were based upon the
Buchanan holding. HB 32 not only deprives the mineral owner
of a valuable right, but confers an unbargained-for bonanza
upon surface owners. There has been far too much justifiable
reliance upon Buchanan to turn away from that decision now.
In Spannaus, the Court concluded: "Entering a field it had
never before sought to regulate, the Minnesota Legislature grossly
distorted the company's existing contractual relationships with
its employees by superimposing retroactive obligations upon the
company substantially beyond the terms of its employment con-
tracts."'' Similarly, although the Kentucky legislature has reg-
ulated strip mining in the past, the Kentucky legislature has not
in the past regulated the interpretation of broad form deeds.
With this first entrance into the field, the legislature has sub-
stantially altered the rights, rather than the obligations, of the
mineral owner.
Not all recent Supreme Court cases are favorable to the
mineral owners' position, however. Several have upheld legisla-
tion challenged on contract clause grounds, but they are distin-
guishable. In Texaco Inc. v. Short,3 2 discussed earlier, the Indiana
Mineral Lapse Act "3 was challenged not only as a taking of
property without just compensation, but also under the contract
clause. It is not clear whether the mineral owners in Short alleged
that the act impaired the obligation of the original severance
I" See e.g., Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1976);
Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964); Buchanan v. Watson,
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956); Mclntire v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921). See
also Peabody Coal Co. v. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1971) and Peabody Coal Co.
v. Erwin, 453 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1971).
" Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 249-50.
' 454 U.S. 516 (1982); see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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deeds or of subsequently executed leases. In any case, the Su-
preme Court did not reach the former issue. Noting that the
leases in question had not been executed until after the statutory
lapse, the Court stated:
The statute cannot be said to impair a contract that did not
exist at the time of its enactment. Appellants' right to enter
such an agreement of course has been impaired by the statute;
this right, however, is a property right and not a contract
right. In any event, a mineral owner may safeguard any con-
tractual obligations or rights by filing a statement of claims in
the county recorder's office. Such a minimal "burden" on
contractual obligations is not beyond the scope of permissible
state action.1"4
The situation presented by HB 32 is much different. The
contracts involved, the severance deeds themselves, were exe-
cuted prior to passage of the Act. Moreover, as noted in the
earlier discussion of the Court's treatment of the taking clause
issue in Short, HB 32 (unlike the Indiana Act) contains no
savings clause. Accordingly, Short's holding on the contract
clause issue is clearly distinguishable.
In another recent case raising contract clause questions, Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton,13 5 the Supreme Court had occasion to con-
sider the constitutionality of an Alabama statute that increased
the severance tax on oil and gas extracted from Alabama wells
and prohibited producers from passing on the increase to their
purchasers."36 Several oil and gas producers filed suit, contending
among other things that the prohibition of pass-through provi-
sions was an unconstitutional impairment of contract, at least
as applied to pre-existing contracts containing such provisions.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, saying,
"the pass-through prohibition did not prescribe a rule limited in
effect to contractual obligations or remedies, but instead im-
posed a generally applicable rule of conduct designed to advance
a 'broad societal interest,' ... protecting consumers from ex-
114 Short, 454 U.S. at 531.
"' 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
"' The statute under review was 1979 Ala. Acts, No. 79-434, p. 687. § I, as
amended, ALA. CODE § 40-20-2(d) (1982).
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cessive prices."'13 7 The Court distinguished United States Trust
Co. and Spannaus, stating that the statutes challenged in those
cases directly adjusted the rights of contracting parties, while
the Alabama statute challenged in Eagerton left intact most of
the rights and obligations established by the parties' contract
and had only an incidental effect on a rather minor provision
of the contract.'13
Such is not true with HB 32. Often, mining may be com-
mercially unfeasible by any methods other than strip mining. In
such cases, HB 32 may effectively deprive the mineral owner of
all the rights he may have reasonably expected under his deed
of severance. Moreover, the alleged impairment of contractual
rights is hardly incidental. The sole purpose and effect of HB
32 is to alter what was formerly held to be the contractual
obligations of the grantor and grantee under a deed of severance.
V. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Another argument against the constitutionality of HB 32
centers on the doctrine of separation of powers. By mandating
a particular interpretation for a class of deeds, the legislature
may have unconstitutionally invaded the province of the judici-
ary. Although there is no federal constitutional requirement that
state legislatures refrain from exercising judicial power, the Ken-
tucky constitution clearly mandates such a separation of pow-
ers.
39
The question then becomes whether the interpretation of
broad form deeds is exclusively within the "judicial power."
That term is not defined in the Kentucky constitution itself, but
its meaning has been discussed in Rohde v. City of Newport.'4
At issue in Rohde was the validity of a Kentucky statute pro-
hibiting any city council from issuing public bonds until a court
Eagerlon, 462 U.S. at 191.
"" Id. at 192.
"' KY. CONST. § 109. Section 109 provides: "The judicial power of the common-
wealth shall be vested exclusively in one Court of Justice. . . ." The Kentucky consti-
tution further prohibits encroachment upon this power in § 28: "No person or collection
of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly
belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed
or permitted."
,m 55 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1932).
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of competent jurisdiction had approved the issuance as being
constitutional. The plaintiff argued that this was an unconsti-
tutional grant of nonjudicial power to the courts. Kentucky's
highest court disagreed, saying: "It is the distinctive nature of
judicial power to determine rights and obligations with reference
to transactions that are past, or concerning conditions that exist
at the time of the exercise of the power.' '
4
The interpretation of deeds certainly is a determination of
rights and obligations with reference to tranactions that are past,
and would, therefore, fall within the general definition of judi-
cial power found in Rohde. There are, however, many instances
of state legislation that confirm or modify in some way the
interpretation of deeds or other legal instruments. It may be
useful, therefore, to examine the limits of this legislative power.
It is generally held that, despite constitutional prohibitions
against assuming judicial powers, the legislature is free to enact
curative statutes as long as they do not impair vested rights or
deprive persons of specific titles. 42 The Kentucky statute provid-
ing that a conveyance shall not be void or invalid because of a
-defective certification by the county clerk' 43 is an example of
such a curative statute. There are, presumably, adverse claimants
who might take title to property if such deeds were held to be
invalid, but such a claim is probably too speculative to be
deemed a vested right, and the legislature is therefore free to
extinguish it.
Similarly, there are numerous examples of legislation en-
acted to codify existing common law rules of interpretation.
For instance, Kentucky has by statute defined such familiar
deed terms as "without heirs,"'" "estate for life, remainder
to heirs,' '1 45 "general warranty"' " and "special warranty." 47
These definitions appear to comport closely with common law
and, therefore, are not unconstitutional assumptions of judi-
cial power by the legislature. Were they to vary prior judicial
" Id. at 370.
42 See H. BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 297 (3rd ed.
1910).
" KRS § 382.230 (1972).
KRS § 381.080 (1972).
" KRS § 381.090 (1972).
KRS § 382.030 (1972).
KRS § 382.040 (1972).
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interpretations, however, they would present a constitutional
question.
A number of statutes, however, do alter common law rules
of construction. Some are explicitly limited to deeds made after
the effective date of the statute.'4 Others have been interpreted
to apply only prospectively. For instance, Kentucky has pro-
vided by statute (in contrast to the common law rule) that, a
conveyance of real estate to husband and wife does not create
a right of survivorship unless that right is expressly provided
for. 4 9 In Elliot v. Nichols, " Kentucky's highest court held that
this statute applied only prospectively, and, indeed, suggested
that the legislature could not have made the rule retroactive.
The Court reasoned that prior to enactment of the statute a:
grant to husband and wife vested title in both. Thus, "[t]he
Legislature could not have diverted any portion of the title, and
we must presume did not intend to do so, ..
Notwithstanding this language, several Kentucky statutes
in derogation of the common law purport to apply retroac-
tively. One such statute is Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
section 381.221, which makes unenforceable any possibility of
reverter or right of entry created prior to enactment of the
statute unless the owper thereof records a declaration of in-
tent to preserve his interest within five years from passage
of the act. Apparently, this savings provision was added to
surmount constitutional objections, ' 2 and the courts have
since upheld the statute on two grounds: first, the savings
clause transforms the statute into "the equivalent of a stat-
ute of limitations,"'' 3 and second, a possibility of reverter or
right of entry amounts to no more than a mere expectancy, and
"' E.g., KRS § 381.219 (1972) which states in part:
A fee simple subject to a right of entry for condition broken shall become
a fee simple absolute if the specified contingency does not occur within
thirty (30) years from the effective date of the instrument creating such fee
simple subject to a right of entry. If such contingency occurs within said
thirty (30) years the right of entry, which may be created in a person other
than the person creating the interest or his heirs, shall become exercisable
notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities.
"4 KRS § 381.050 (Supp. 1984).
67 Ky. 502 (1868).
Id. at 506.
Compare KRS § 381.218-19 (1972) with KRS § 381.221 (1972) (the former have
no saving provisions while the latter does).
I" Atkinson v. Kish, 420 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Ky. 1967).
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does not come within the constitutional protection afforded
"vested rights." 4
One Kentucky statute amending the common law purports
to apply retrospectively without any savings clause. KRS section
381.070 converts estates entailed into estates in fee, whether
created prior or subsequent to the passage of the statute.'" There
are apparently no cases reaching the constitutional question
raised by retroactive application of this statute. However, the
interest cut off by this statute was a possibility of reverter which
has been held in another context to be not sufficiently "vested"
as to acquire constitutional protection."4
These examples raise questions discussed in the previous sec-
tions of this article, and demonstrate the interrelation of the
constitutional issues involved here. To the extent that a property
interest is "vested," a statute invalidating it may constitute an
impairment of contractual obligations or a "taking." Moreover,
a legislative attempt to affect "vested" rights, by dictating a
particular construction for a class of deeds, may unconstitu-
tionally infringe on the power of the courts.
There are several Kentucky cases dealing with alleged exer-
cises of judicial power by the legislature, but none are directly
applicable. Most of these cases deal with an act of the legislature
which purports to prescribe a rule of procedure. For instance,
the Kentucky courts struck down statutes limiting punishment
for contempt of court in Arnett v. Meade'5 7 and limiting the
prayer for damages in malpractice actions in McCoy v. Western
Baptist Hospital. 8 More recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court
in Lewis v. Smothers'59 struck down a statute prohibiting the
courts from enjoining the operation of an administrative order
for the revocation of suspension of a liquor license pending
appeal.160 In so holding, the court stated:
lu Cline v. Johnson County Bd. of Educ., 548 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Ky. 1977).
-1 KRS § 381.070 (1972).
See Cline, 548 S.W.2d at 508.
, 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971) (the court found the legislation to be an unreasonable
restriction which could defeat or materially impair the exercise of judicial functions).
,18 628 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (holding the action to be an invasion of
rule making power of courts).
672 S.W.2d 62 (Ky. 1984).
See KRS § 243.580(2) and (3) (1981) which was the statute under review.
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This issue is in essence the "flip side" of the Arnett v.
Meade, supra, issue. As we discussed earlier, in Arnett, the
legislature tried to place limits upon the punishment a court
could mete out for contempt. This Court held that the legis-
lature could not set limits that interfered with the inherent
judicial power to function. Id. at 948. In the case at bar the
legislature has attempted to interfere with the judicial power
in an inverse manner. Rather than attempting to limit the
court's power to punish, it has attempted to limit the court's
power to stay a possibly unjustly imposed punishment. In KRS
243.580(2) as in Arnett the legislative attempt so interferes with
the judicial power as to render those legislated limits uncon-
stitutional. '6
One might read these Kentucky cases as merely prohibiting
the legislature from enacting procedural rules. Such a reading
would be too narrow, however. In Thweatt v. Bank of Hop-
kinsville,'6 Kentucky's highest court considered an act of the
General Assembly purportedly validating a deed entered into by
the Bank of Kentucky. The court struck down the law since it
had been passed during the pendency of the lawsuit. In dicta,
the court indicated that the statute would be constitutional as
applied to a case not pending at the time of its enactment, since
it did not impair the obligation of contract, or affect substantial
equities or vested rights. This latter test also expresses a limit of
legislative power.
This is similar to the rule followed by other jurisdictions.
For instance, in Davis v. Union Pacific Ry. ,163 the Kansas Su-
preme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that
attempted to avoid the operation of a judicial determination.'
6
4
A prior Kansas case had held that a grant of property to two
people "or the survivor of them" was not sufficient to create a
joint tenancy.'1 In response, the legislature enacted the chal-
lenged statute, which dictated an opposite result. In striking
down the act, the court cited this paragraph from a treatise on
constitutional limitations:
Lewis, 672 S.W.2d at 65.
' 81 Ky. 1 (1883).
'6 476 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1970).
'" The statute under review was KAN. STAT. ANN § 58-2270 (Supp. 1969).
Davis, 476 P.2d at 638, citing Riggs v. Snell, 250 P.2d 54 (Kan. 1960).
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As the legislature cannot set aside the construction of the
law already applied by the courts to actual cases, neither can
it compel the courts for the future to adopt a particular con-
struction of a law which the legislature permits to remain in
force. "To declare what the law is, or has been is a judicial
power, to declare what the law shall be is legislative. . .." 66
The Davis case is closely analogous to that presented by HB
32. Both involve legislative attempts to undo the interpretation
of certain deeds by the courts. Both involve statutes that apply
retroactively, in that they purport to dictate a particular inter-
pretation of deeds executed prior to their enactment. Although
the absence of applicable Kentucky precedent makes it difficult
to predict how the Kentucky courts may deal with HB 32, the
rationale of the Davis court is compelling. The interpretation of
deeds is normally a judicial function. Certainly there are many
instances in which the legislature has acted to confirm the valid-
ity of certain titles or to prospectively change the law dealing
with transfer of interest in real property. When, however, the
legislature seeks to "determine rights and obligations with ref-
erence to transactions that are passed,"' 167 it exercises a power
which is essentially judicial. Accordingly, HB 32 may well violate
the separation of powers mandated by the Kentucky constitution.
DUE PROCESS AND "IRREBUTTABLE" PRESUMPTIONS
A final constitutional challenge to HB 32 focuses on the
presumption mandated by the Act. In instances where HB 32
applies, a presumption arises concerning the intent of the parties
to a severance deed. This presumption may be rebutted by "clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary."' ' As noted above,
such evidence will not normally be available, 69 and the require-
ment that any such proof be "clear and convincing" may as a
practical matter render HB 32's presumption irrebuttable.
1 Davis, 476 P.2d at 641 (quoting COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 191 (8th
ed. 1977)).
' Rohde, 55 S.W.2d at 370.
KRS § 381.940 (Supp. 1984).
' See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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If so, the Act may well be unconstitutional, for as the
Supreme Court noted in the recent case of Vlandis v. Kline,' °
"[s]tatutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have
long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.''7 At issue in Vlandis was the
constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that created an irre-
buttable presumption that certain individuals were non-residents
for the purpose of calculating tuition due at state universities.'7
In striking down the law, the Court stated that "a statute
creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity
to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' '
7 1
Although the presumption created by HB 32 is not irrebutt-
able on its face, it may nonetheless "operate to deny a fair
opportunity to rebut it." 17 The Supreme Court has not, how-
ever, had occasion to consider whether a presumption that is
rebuttable, at least in name, may be irrebuttable in fact-and
thus violative of due process. Given the more serious constitu-
tional problems which face HB 32 as discussed above, it is
unlikely that a court would overturn the Act on this basis alone.
VII. Doochin v. Rackley
Finally, a word must be said concerning the Tennessee case
of Doochin v. Rackley.'"7 In Doochin, the Tennessee Supreme
Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of a
Tennessee statute almost identical to HB 32.176 Indeed, it appears
that the Tennessee statute was used as a model for HB 32.'"7
The Tennessee court upheld the statute against the same consti-
tutional challenges discussed in this article, as well as one based
on the equal protection clause. The case is distinguishable, how-
ever, since the Tennessee courts had previously held that some
-- 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
171Id. at 446.
1,2 Id. at 442-43; see also CONN. Gm. STAT. REv. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1969) as
amended by Public Act No. 5, § 122 (June Sess. 1971).
" Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 446 (quoting Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932)).
7 Id. (also quoting Heiner, at 329).
"7 610 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn. 1981).
"6 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-511 (Supp. 1980) (currently codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-5-102 (1982)).
I" See supra note 64.
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(if not all) deeds of severance did not grant the right to surface
mine.' This fact is crucial to the reasoning of the court:
Since neither the plaintiffs nor their predecessor in title
was ever conveyed the legal right to strip mine, it follows, and
we hold, that the 1977 Act did not deprive them of property
without due process. The Act merely codified the common law
governing the construction of deeds and other such contracts.
Nor does the Act encroach upon the domain of the Judi-
ciary. Rather, the statutes codify the age-old, common law
rule that the intent of the parties governs in the construction
of contracts, deeds, wills and the like.1
7 9
In Kentucky, by contrast, courts have construed the broad
form deed as conveying grantees the legal right to strip mine. 80
Depriving them of that right therefore has very different consti-
tutional implications. Moreover, the Kentucky Act does more
than simply "codify the age-old, common law rule."'' Although
it purports to do no more than give effect to the intent of the
parties, the statute actually upsets the settled judicial interpre-
tation of that intent. The intent has not changed: what has
changed is the legal effect of the parties' manifestation of that
intent. Since the Tennessee statute challenged in Doochin did
not work such a change, Doochin is of questionable relevance
to HB 32.
CONCLUSION
HB 32 is constitutionally suspect on several grounds. Whether
it is ultimately upheld may depend on how firmly the Kentucky
"I An earlier Tennessee case, Campbell v. Campbell, 199 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1946), held that a mineral reservation "with sufficient privilege to operate and
market the same" did not reserve to the grantor the right to destroy the surface by
causing subsidence. It is difficult to determine how far this holding would have been
extended. Such determination is rendered unnecessary, however, since the Doochin court,
without citing Campbell, concluded as a matter of common law that deeds such as those
described by the statute did not grant the right to strip mine.
Doochin, 610 S.W.2d at 719.
' See, e.g., Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1976);
Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964); Buchanan v. Watson,
290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956); McIntire v. Marian Coal Co., 227 S.W. 298 (Ky. 1921). See
also Peabody Coal Co. v. Pasco, 452 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1971) and Peabody Coal Co.
v. Erwin, 453 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1971).
. Doochin, 610 S.W.2d at 719.
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Supreme Court is wedded to its prior interpretation of broad
form deeds. To the extent that the court remains loyal to its
prior cases, this legislative attempt to reverse the holdings of
those cases will face serious constitutional problems. But if the
judiciary's attitude toward broad form deeds has changed in
recent years, and it seeks a way out of its previous holdings,
HB 32 may provide just such an opportunity. In any case, it is
clear that the final word on broad form deeds in Kentucky has
yet to be heard.
